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TAX TREATMENT OF ACCRUED INTEREST ON
CONVERTIBLE BONDS-A DILEMMA FOR
CORPORATE TAXPAYERS
The popularity of convertible bonds and debentures' has increased
markedly over the past several decades. As a means of indirect equity
financing, the use of convertible bonds enables the issuing corporation
to postpone dilution of its equity, an obvious advantage to shareholders,
and permits the corporation to deduct from its gross income the interest
paid on the bonds up to the time of conversion. Moreover, the conver-
sion feature operates as a hedge for both lender and borrower against
possible failure of trading on the equity venture.2 Generally, the con-
vertibility of bonds enhances their market value and otherwise improves
market acceptance of such securities.3 The use of the convertible bond,
however, is not without problems, particularly in the area of income
taxation.
The difficulties which a corporation may encounter with respect to
its treatment, for income tax purposes, of convertible bond interest
accrued but unpaid to the bondholders at the time of conversion were
illustrated recently in Columbia Gas System, Inc. v. United States.'
1. "A convertible bond is simply a bond convertible into stock under certain con-
ditions." In re Will of Migel, 71 Misc. 2d 640, 336 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379 (Sur. Ct. 1972).
For purposes of this Comment, the distinctions which may be drawn between a bond
and a debenture are immaterial.
2. If the venture is successful, holders of convertible debentures presumably would
elect to have an ownership share. Such an arrangement is attractive to the debenture
holder in that a secured indebtedness is retained until such time as it appears that
an equity ownership would be more profitable and that the success of the venture
warrants a surrender of the status of secured creditor. The corporation is advantaged,
in that it has raised equity funds indirectly while receiving a greater contribution than
if it had attempted to finance by sale of its stock. In addition, the dilution of equity
which results from conversion under profitable circumstances obviously is of mimmal
impact.
If the venture is less profitable or fails, the debenture holder would elect not to
convert in order to remain protected from loss by his status as a secured creditor.
The corporation would be protected from dilution because conversion rights would
not be exercised. See generally C. PiLCHER, RAISING CAPITAL WITH CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES
61, 138 (1955).
3. See generally Bums & Levitt, Package Offerings of Convertible Debentures, TUL.
19,m TAX INsr. 307, 308-10 (1970); Fleischer & Cary, The Taxation of Convertible
Bonds and Stock, 74 HAiv. L. Rxv. 473, 474 (1961)
4. 473 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir. 1973).
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The corporation issued 10-year convertible debentures with interest
payable semiannually The debentures contained a "no adjustment"
clause which relieved the corporation of liability for cash payment of
interest accrued at the date of conversion.5 Each month, the corpora-
tion posted on its books as a reduction of capital surplus the accrued
interest on all outstanding debentures. This interest similarly was en-
tered as a tax-deductible expense item on the corporation's tax returns,
pursuant to section 163 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.6 When a
bond was converted between semiannual payment dates, the corpora-
tion, in accordance with the "no adjustment" clause, made no cash
payment of the interest accrued since the last payment date. However,
no adjustment was made on the corporation's tax returns to reflect
the nonpayment of interest previously deducted.
Pursuant to a tax audit, the Internal Revenue Service characterized
the nonpayment of accrued interest as a discharge of indebtedness
reportable as gross income7 and assessed a deficiency for the years 1955
and 1956. For the two ensuing years, the Commissioner simply dis-
allowed the deductions. The corporation paid the additional taxes and
brought a refund action.
It should be noted that whether an adjustment is made to gross income
to reflect a discharge of indebtedness or an interest deduction is simply
disallowed, the result is an identical increase in taxable income. The
controlling issue in both cases is whether the accrued interest indebted-
ness formed an integral part of the conversion and should be deemed
to have been paid by the corporation in exchange for the conversion
stock or, on the other hand, was discharged merely as an incident to
the conversion transaction.
The government apparently conceded that the deductions for interest
expense were properly taken in anticipation of the future payment
of such interest; basic disagreement arose as to whether the interest
5. The clause provided that "there shall be no adjustment in respect of interest or
dividends on the conversion of any Debenture " Id. at 1246.
6. IN. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163 (a) provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction
all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a) (12) states, in pertinent part: "[Giross income
means all income from whatever source derived, including [i]ncome from dis-
charge of indebtedness.' This section is a codification of the tax benefit rule, which
dictates, as a matter of logic and fair play, that when an accrual basis debtor has
accrued and deducted a liability, the subsequent cancellation of that liability generates
taxable income. See Helvering v. Jane Holding Co., 109 F.2d 933 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 653 (1940); B.F Avery & Sons, 26 B.T.A. 1393 (1932); Rich, The
Tax Benefit Rule, N.Y.U. 7u-s INsr. o N FED. Tax. 257 (1959).
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was actually paid when the bonds were converted. The government
contended that upon conversion, the liability for unpaid interest was
discharged with a resulting tax benefit which, depending on the year
in question, either generated income taxable as a discharge of indebt-
edness or warranted disallowance of the deduction. The corporation
responded that at conversion, the bondholder surrendered all claims
against it arising by virtue of his bond ownership. Arguing that these
claims included the right to accrued interest as well as the right to the
bond principal, the corporation characterized the extinguishment of the
interest debt as partial payment for the stock. Accordingly, it was
maintained that the finding of a discharge of indebtedness with a con-
comitant tax benefit was unwarranted.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the issue
in Columbia Gas was "strikingly similar" 8 to that which had faced
the Court of Claims in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States,9 although
that case involved only a disallowance of accrued interest deductions.
The Court of Claims initially had attempted to resolve the opposing
arguments by reference to statutory mandate and judicial precedent.
No provision of the Internal Revenue Code, however, specifically
addresses the treatment to be afforded a bond-for-stock exchange pur-
suant to a previously agreed upon conversion privilege including a "no
adjustment" of interest clause. Moreover, the court in Bethlehem Steel
found no judicial precedent to guide it,10 although the corporation, as
will be noted, argued the applicability of a series of cases involving
corporate reorganizations and recapitalizations." Further complicating
8. 473 F.2d at 1247
9. 434 F.2d 1357 (Ct. CL. 1970).
10. Id. at 1360. The following early administrative promulgation, however, supports
the decisions in Columbia Gas and Bethlehen Steel:
Where gold notes of the M Corporation were converted into preferred
stock of that corporation [pursuant to a conversion privilege] in January,
1934, the unpaid interest accrued from August 1, 1933, to December 31,
1933 was properly treated as an accrued liability deductible in the return
for the year 1933. As the liability which was accrued m 1933 was can-
celed in 1934, the amount thereof constitutes taxable income for the latter
year.
IT 2884, XIV-1 CUM. BULL. 151 (1935).
11. The corporation in Bethlehem Steel also attempted to analogize to the treatment
-of amortized bond discounts. A bond discount is a cost of borrowing money repre-
sented by a bond issuance at an amount less than that for which the issuer-debtor obli-
gates himself to pay at maturity An accrual basis taxpayer is permitted to amortize
this borrowing cost over the life of the debt. Helvering v. Union Pacific R.R., 293
U.S. 282 (1934); Treas. Reg. 1.64-12(c) (3) (1957); I.T. 1412, 1-2 CUM. BuLL. 91
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--the adjudicative task was the finding that the conflicting positions of the
litigants seemed equally persuasive, both courts noting the substantiality
of the countervailing contentions and the court in Columbia Gas stating
.that it sought "a solution reflecting the equities." 1 2 The adoption of
-an equitable position may have been the only rational and fair course
-under the circumstances; nevertheless, it is indicative of the failure of
statutory and judicial authority to provide the high degree of certainty
and predictability which. for policy reasons, is essential to orderly ad-
immstration of the tax laws and to intelligent planning and decision-
making by taxpayers.
In Columbia Gas, the corporation argued, as had the taxpayer in
Bethlehem Steel, that Hummel-Ross Fibre Corp. v. Commissioner 3
-authorized the treatment of interest in a bond-for-stock conversion as
having been paid. In Hummel-Ross, the Board of Tax Appeals held
that where bonds with attached interest coupons, some of wich repre-
sented accrued but unpaid interest, were exchanged for stock pursuant
to a statutory reorgamzation, the stock constituted consideration for
the-surrender of the bonds and the associated interest obligations. The
Board concluded that since the cancellation of interest indebtedness was
an integral part of the exchange, which thus amounted to a payment
of the interest, the deduction was properly taken. 4
The Bethlehem Steel court indicated that the Hummel-Ross holding
was not settled law, noting that in Capento Securities Corp. v. Commis-
stoner,'5 an opposite conclusion was reached on facts similar to those in
Hummel-Ross. Emphasizing that the value of the stock was equal to
-the principle amount of the bonds exchanged and that the parties had
not explained the cancellation of the interest obligation, the Board of
Tax Appeals found in Capento that the release of the interest obligation
(1922). If the issue is discounted convertible bonds, the discount may be amortized
until the bonds are converted. G.C.M. 9674, X-2 Cum. BuLL. 354 (1931). Upon con-
version, however, the tax benefit received from the deduction of previously amortized
,discount does not result in taxable income. See generally Fleischer & Cary, supra note
3, at 511. The corporation in Bethlehem Steel argued that because interest and bond
discount both are costs of borrowing money, they should be afforded the same tax
,treatment; the court apparently found the analogy unpersuasive. 434 F.2d at 1358.
12. 473 F.2d at 1248. In Bethlehem Steel, the difficulty in "reflecting the eqtuties"
was recogized: "Ve recite these adverse positions not to decide or demonstrate that
they outweigh plaintiff's arguments but rather to show that, if plaintiff has
substantial grounds for its stance, so does the other side." 434 F.2d at 1360.
13. 40 B.T.A. 821 (1939).
14. Accord, Central Elec. & Tel. Co., 47 B.T.A. 434 (1942); Shamrock Oil & Gas Co.,
42 B.T.A. 1016 (1940).
[5. 47 B.TA. 691 (1942).
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was not an element of the recapitalization, but rather a mere dis-
charge of the indebtedness.
Furthermore, in Columbia Gas, as well as Bethlehem Steel, Hummel-
Ross was distinguished on the basis of the circumstances which sur-
rounded the conversion-exchange. In Hummel-Ross the terms of the
exchange were negotiated with a view to achieving a mutual trade-off
at the time of the exchange. As the Columbia Gas court noted, the
corporation "effected an exchange of securities for outstanding indebt-
edness-an exchange in which accrued interest specifically was an inte-
gral part." " Conversely, in Columbia Gas and Bethlehem Steel, the
terms of conversion were fixed at the time the bonds were issued.' 7
This distinction, based upon the time of agreement to the exchange
terms, appears to be valid. In the reorganization cases, since the terms
were negotiated after the interest had accrued, it seems reasonable to
assume, in the absence of some contrary indication, that the parties
included the interest in their bargain. In the conversion situation, how-
ever, since the terms were fixed without knowledge of how much in-
terest would be involved, no such assumption is warranted. Moreover,
the courts in Columbia Gas and Bethlehem Steel emphasized that the
fluctuation in the price of the stock (and consequently the value of the
conversion rights to the bondholder) bore no relation to the amount
of accrued interest at any point in time.
Unable to ascertain the intent of the parties from the general terms
of the conversion or by analogy to the reorganization cases, the court
in Columbia Gas examined the "no adjustment" clause. Quotmg exten-
sively from Bethlehem Steel, the court stated that resolution of the issue
would have been simple if the "no adjustment" clause had made ex-
plicit provision for the disposition of accrued interest.'8 Specifically, if
the clause had provided that the bondholder's right to accrued but
unpaid interest was to be surrendered in payment for stock,'9 the court
would have considered the accrued interest paid by the corporation and
an interest deduction authorized under the principle of Hummel-Ross.
16. 473 F.2d at 1249.
17. The court in Bethlehem Steel observed: "Since the terms were all pre-fixed,
there could not have been a mutual ad hoc evaluation and trade-off of relevant ele-
ments at the time of the conversion exchange as there was in the Hummel-Ross
line of cases." 434 F.2d at 1359.
18. 473 F.2d at 1248-49.
19. The Bethlehem Steel court used as an example the following clause: "On con-
version, unpaid interest on a debenture shall be deemed to be paid through receipt of
the common stock exchanged for the debentures being converted." 434 F.2d at 1360.
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On the other hand, had the clause provided that the corporation's
liability for unpaid interest was to be discharged at the tnie of con-
version, 20 the interest would not have been considered paid and the
deduction disallowed under the principle of Capento.
Unfortunately, the "no adjustment" clause at issue in Columbia Gas,
like that involved in Bethlehem Steel, was sufficiently ambiguous to
permit the conclusion that either a payment or discharge was intended.
Consequently, the court in Columbia Gas"1 followed the approach of
the Court of Claims in Bethlehem Steel,22 basing its decision not on
the substance of the "no adjustment" clause but upon the general rule
of contract law that an ambiguous writing must be construed against
the draftsman, in this instance the corporation offering the convertible
bonds.
A second deficiency was assessed against Columbia Gas System by
the Commissioner for two earlier years on the basis of an adjustment
in gross income attributable to the "tax benefit" of the discharge of
interest indebtedness. While Bethlehem Steel did not involve such
an adjustment, the court in Columbia Gas correctly decided that the
dispositive issue with respect to an adjustment for discharge of indebted-
ness income was identical to that involved in disallowance of interest
deductions.23
20. The Bethlehem Steel court illustrated such a clause: "On conversion, any un-
paid accrued interest on any debenture being converted shall be cancelled, forfeited,
and not paid." Id.
21. 473 F.2d at 1249.
22. 434 F.2d at 1360.
23. 473 F.2d at 1249.
The taxpayer in Columbta Gas argued that even if it should be deemed to have
realized income mn the year of conversion, it should be able to postpone recognition
of the income under INT. Rv. CODE oF 1954, § 108(a). That section permits deferred
recognition, at the taxpayer's election, of any income generated by a discharge of
indebtedness. In conjunction with Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1017, discharge of
indebtedness income may be excluded from the debtor's current taxable income if the
taxpayer consents to a reduction in the basis of his assets in an equivalent amount.
Since this process will result in higher reported income in subsequent years because
of a lower depreciation or sales basis in the assets, taxation on the income is simply
postponed until the assets are either transferred or fully depreciated. The original
object of the consent election, to defer taxation of firms in financial difficulty, re-
mains its major impact in many situations.
For a taxpayer who would otherwise wish to use section 108 to postpone income, a
possible dilemma exists if he is unsure whether the debt forgiveness has resulted in
taxable income. The Internal Revenue Service requires a filing of the section 108 con-
sent with the same tax return upon which the taxable income would otherwise be
reportable. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1017-1 & -2 (1956). In the convertible bond situation the
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The primary import of the decisions in Bethlehem Steel and Columbia-
Gas is to demonstrate that existing tax law does not definitively govern,
the taxability of accrued interest on convertible bonds where the terms,
of conversion do not clearly provide either that interest indebtednes
shall be discharged or that it shall be paid through issuance of stock.
Hence, the corporation whose convertible bonds are issued under unclear
conversion terms cannot deduct its interest expense with any certainty
that it will not be assessed for discharge of indebtedness income on
"unpaid" accrued interest when the bonds are converted. The bond-
holder must also share in the uncertainty, since it is likely that if the
corporation is not taxed on accrued interest, the bondholder will be.2'
There is substantial statutory and judicial support for an approach by
which the problem of construing unclear conversion terms might be
minimized. The tax law not only permits but requires that a deduction
for accrued interest be made in the year in which the interest liability
becomes fixed and certain. Where there exists some contingency with
respect to the liability, as a general rule, no accrual is permitted.26 The
contingency must be one which determines the legal rights of the
parties; 27 mere uncertainty as to whether the debtor will meet his estab-
consent should be filed in the year of conversion, not when it is subsequently deter-
mined that there is a deficiency
In special cases, where reasonable cause is shown, an amended consent may be
filed. Treas. Reg. § 1.108(a)-2 (1956). However, as the petitioner m Columbia Gas-
discovered, "reasonable cause" does not include genuine uncertainty or confusion as to
what constitutes a payment or discharge of indebtedness. Alleviating this dilemma
somewhat is the apparent willingness of the Commissioner to accept consents con-
ditioned upon a subsequent determination that the discharge generates income. Eustice,
Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping
Confusion, 14 TAX L. Rav. 225, 262 (1959); Greenbaum, Income front Debt Cancellation
and Reduction, N.Y.U. 19TH INsT. oN FED. TAx. 53, 62 (1961) Whatever the legal merits
of this position, it does not seem logical to expect the Commissioner to accept
delayed consents to postponement of income where the income results from an expense
deduction that may have been improper in the first instance.
24. The Bethlehem Steel court noted this likelihood without deciding the point.
434 F.2d at 1361. See notes 36-41 mnfra & accompanying text.
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a) (2) (1957) provides: "Under an accrual method of
accounting, an expense is deductible for the taxable year in which all the events have
occurred which determine the fact of the liability and the amount thereof can be
determined with reasonable accuracy"
26. See, e.g., Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir.
1969); Lutz v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1968); Coopertown Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 144 F.2d 693 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 772 (1944).
27 This legal contingency is usually expressed in terms of whether "all events" have
occurred which fix both the liability and its amount. Commissioner v. Fifth Ave.
Coach Lines, Inc., 281 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. dented, 366 U.S. 964 (1961).
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lished legal obligation is insufficient.28 It is well settled that where an
obligation to pay interest is contingent upon the happening of some
future event, the interest is not accruable until the contingency has
occurred and the duty to pay becomes absolute.29
It would appear that in a convertible bond situation where the con-
version terms relieve the corporation of liability for cash payment of
accrued interest, the obligation to pay such interest is contingent upon
the nonconversion of the bonds in the interim between payment dates.
However, application of the contingent deduction analysis also requires
a determination of whether the forgiveness of interest constituted
a payment or a discharge. A corporation seeking to deduct accrued
interest on its outstanding convertible bonds may be expected to argue
that at conversion, there is a payment and satisfaction of the accrued
interest. Under this theory, no contingency is involved, since interest
will be "paid" either in cash on the interest payment date or in stock
at conversion.
Thus, the contingency issue ultimately involves the same question
faced in Columbia Gas, that is, whether, under the terms of conver-
sion, the parties intended that accrued interest form a basis of the
exchange. It is submitted that a potentially useful approach, in all cases
where the conversion terms do not explicitly provide that accrued
interest shall be deemed partial payment for conversion stock, would
be to disallow the deduction of accrued interest and require the tax-
payer to claim the deduction for the year in which interest is actually
paid in cash, or, if the taxpayer feels it can demonstrate that such interest
constituted an element of the exchange, at conversion. 30 The effect
28. It has been held that interest may be deducted once the liability is fixed and
certain, "even though the course of conduct of the parties indicated the likelihood
of payment was extremely doubtful." Edward L. Cohen, 21 T.C. 855, 857 (1954).
See Rev. Rul. 70-367, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. 37
29. Burlington-Rock Island R.R. v. United States, 321 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964); The 1220 Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d
495 (6th Cir. 1963); Pierce Estates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1952);
Dixie Pine Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1943), aff'd, 320
U.S. 516 (1944). Cf. Campbell v. Sailer, 224 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1955).
30. There is even less basis for permitting a deduction of accrued interest where-
the conversion and consequent discharge of indebtedness, if it be such, takes place in
the same tax year as the initial accrual. Several Tax Court decisions support the propo-
sition that if an accrual indebtedness is discharged in the same year as the creation of
the accrual, the latter is simply disallowed. McConway & Tarley Corp., 2 T.C. 593,
596 (1943) ("[Wlhere the indebtedness and interest were cancelled during the
taxable year, deduction of such interest for the taxable year may not be allowed.").
See Pancoast Hotel Co., 2 T.C. 362 (1943); George Hall Corp., 2 T.C. 146 (1943).
19731
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of such an approach would be to discourage attempts by corporate
taxpayers to take advantage of ambiguity in conversion terms.31
The approach suggested here is supported by Revenue Ruling 68-170,
which held on facts similar to those in Columbia Gas that the interest
expense was improperly accrued. 2 The Bethlehem Steel court seemed
to indicate that Revenue Ruling 68-170 is applicable only if the lan-
guage of the bond agreement made clear that upon conversion, unpaid
accrued interest would be discharged and not paid.33 It is submitted,
however, that the language of the ruling is considerably broader, sub-
suming any situation in which the bondholder, upon conversion, "would
lose the interest accruing." 3' The ruling could, with reason, be applied
in any instance wherein bond conversion terms do not express clearly
that unpaid accrued interest shall be deemed paid through receipt of
stock. As a result, corporations would be encouraged to make explicit
the terms of conversion, specifically the treatment to be afforded accrued
interest.
Arguably, however, the terms of the conversion agreement should not
be determinative of the corporation's tax liability, since the agreement
controls only the substantive rights of the parties and should not bind
31. Under present law, a corporation may wish to deduct accrued interest, not-
withstanding the probability that taxable income subsequently may be generated under
the tax benefit/discharge of indebtedness rule, on the theory that any postponement of
taxes is an economic gain. If, in such case, the original deduction were disallowed
rather than merely adjusting income in the year of conversion, the taxpayer would
pay not only the tax on the interest but also interest on the tax running from the
year of the disallowed deduction. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6601. Although the
six percent rate of interest on unpaid taxes prescribed by section 6601 is not an abso-
lute deterrent to postponement attempts, it would be a substantial factor militating
against a contemplated attempt. Additionally, a postponement attempt could conceivably
run afoul of INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 6653 (a), which. provides a penalty for intentional
underpayment of tax.
32. Rev. Rul. 68-170, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 71, provides in pertinent part:
[No deduction for interest is allowable for the period from the prior
interest payment date to the date of conversion since no interest ever
became due or accruable for that period. The fact that the common
stock into which the bond was converted had a value greater than the
bond at the time of the conversion has no relevancy to the determination
of a deduction for interest on the bonds.
Note, however, that I.T. 2894, XIV-1 CuM. BuLL. 151 (1935), reaches an opposite
conclusion-the interest was considered accruable during the year, but subsequent con-
version discharged the indebtedness and taxable income was generated at that time.
33. 434 F.2d at 1360.
34. Rev. Rul. 68-170, 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 71. It is important to note that bookkeeping
entries made to establish accruals in no way alter the outcome. The courts will con-




the Commissioner as to the treatment for tax purposes of the rights thus
established. For example, in an agreement such as that involved in
Columbia Gas, the corporation should not, as the court suggested, be
able unilaterally to state that accrued interest "shall be deemed to be
paid" and thereby justify a deduction, where the corporation loses and
the bondholder gains no substantive benefit by postponing conversion
until more interest accrues. This rationale would support a general
rule prohibiting bond issuers from deriving any tax benefit from bond
conversions in which no adjustment is made in the substantive rights of
the parties for the amount of interest accrued but unpaid.-"
Conversely, it could be argued that the relative tax liabilities of the
parties are substantive rights which are the proper subject of a bond
conversion agreement 3 6 Where, as in Columbia Gas, it is found that
the bondholder's claim to accrued interest was discharged as an incident
of the conversion and did not form a basis thereof, no question arises
as to tax liability of the bondholder for such interest. If, however, it
is found that the parties intended the bondholder's claim to interest to
constitute an element of the exchange, the bondholder's tax liability
may be affected.
Ordinarily, the holder of a convertible bond will be willing to re-
linquish his bond and the accrued interest only in exchange for stock
that is worth more than the total of principal and interest. Consequently,
the corporation will realize no income on the exchange and the question
of recognition will not arise3 7  Although the taxpayer will receive
stock worth more than the bonds he converts and thus could be said
to realize income on the transaction, the Internal Revenue Service in
1920 promulgated the bond conversion rule to provide that a bondholder
will not be taxed on any gain from a conversion until he disposes of the
stock.38 Implicit in the rule is the concept that the stock received will
35. Such a rule could be enforced either by making the adjustments sought by the
Commissioner in Columbia Gas or by disallowing all deductions for accrued interest
on convertible bonds on the ground that they are contingent. See notes 25-34 supra
& accompanying text.
36. In another context, the parties to the sale of a business are permitted to fix the
tax treatment of their transaction, witlun certain limitations, by allocating the pro-
ceeds between good will and a covenant not to compete. See generally Note, judicial
Treatment of Covenants Not To Compete: The Third Circuit Takes a Giant Step,
24 TAx L. REv. 513 (1969).
87. For a general discussion of taxation of corporations upon bond conversion, see
Eustice, supra note 23; Fleischer & Cary, supra note 3.
38. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 1563, T.D. 2971, 2 CuM. BuLL. 38 (1920), provides a cogent
explanation of the rule: "Where the owner of a bond exercises the right, provided
for in the bond, of converting the bond into stock in the obligor corporation, such
1973]
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adopt the basis of the bonds transferred and that the transaction con-
stitutes a mere transformation or substitution of security in the hands
of the bondholder.5 9 This rationale loses force, however, where the
gain, realization of which is sought to be postponed, is derived from the
"payment" of accrued interest which purportedly takes place in the
course of the bond conversion. Since the bond conversion rule tradi-
tionally has been narrowly construed, 40 it is likely that a bondholder
would be required to realize income if the corporation is deemed to have
paid the interest.4' If the tax liability of both parties, rather than that of
the corporation alone, is to turn on the conversion terms, then allowing
such terms to be dispositive may be justified.
A general rule governing the deductibility of accrued interest by a
corporation where the terms of the conversion are not to be adjusted to
reflect the nonpayment of accrued interest clearly is desirable from the
standpoint of injecting certainty into the tax laws. Nevertheless, the
goal of certainty may be outweighed by the desirability of allowing
the parties to determine who should bear the tax liability generated by
a bond conversion. The confusion in this area appears to warrant a
substantial reevaluation by the Internal Revenue Service of the rules
and of the "substantial contentions" which the courts in Columbia Gas
and Bethlehem Steel found to exist on both sides of the question. If
it is decided to permit the parties to fix their respective tax liabilities,
the Service should promulgate regulations determining the time and
manner of taxing the bondholder.42
transaction does not result in a realization of profit or loss, the transaction not being
closed for purposes of income taxation until such stock is sold." The rule was made
applicable to subsequent revenue acts by Mim. 3156, H1-2 CuM. BuLL. 24 (1923); I.T.
2216, IV-2 CUM. BuLL. 19 (1925); G.C.M. 18436, 1937-1 CuM. BULL. 101, 102.
39. See generally Eustice, supra note 23; Fleischer & Cary, supra note 3.
40. G.C.M. 18436, 1937-1 CUM. BULL. 101, 102: "This rule of nonrecogition of
gain or loss upon conversion is strictly confined to the factual situation upon which it
is premised, namely, the exercise by the owner of a bond of a right provided for in
the bond of converting the bond into stock of the obligor corporation."
41. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 434 F.2d 1357, 1361 (Ct. GI. 1970).
42. The Bethlehem Steel court considered, without deciding, the time at which the
bondholder would have to realize income. The government had argued that the receipt
of stock by the bondholder in payment of the interest debt could result in gain tax-
able, not at the time of conversion, but when the stock was ultimately sold. 434 F.2d
at 1361, citing Treas. Reg. 45 (1920 ed.), Art. 1563; Mim. 3156, 1I-2 CuM. BULL. 24,
25 (1923); I.T 2216, IV-2 CuM. BULL. 19 (1925); G.C.M. 18436, 1937-1 CUM. BULL.
101, 102; Rev. Rul. 57-535, 1957-2 CuM. BuLL. 513, 516; Rev. Rul. 62-153, 1962-2 CuM.
BULL. 186, 187; Fleischer & Cary, supra note 3, at 477-78. The court observed that
"there has been no holding that the receipt of accrued interest as an incident of con-
version is not taxable gain at the time." 434 F.2d at 1361.
